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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) and
the Utah Constitution Article VIII §3.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the appellate court obtain jurisdiction of this matter upon the filing of the

Notice of Appeal and is "plain error" the appropriate standard of review where:
a.

Appellants made a Motion for a New Trial based upon jury bias, but

passed the jury for cause;
b.

After denial of the Motion for a New Trial, appellants filed a Motion to

Reconsider based upon Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d), the "plain error" rule and U.C. A.
§78-7-24, authority of the courts, claiming insufficient voir dire, but refusing to
characterize their Motion to Reconsider as a Motion for a New Trial (Appellants' Brief
p. 28);
c.

Before obtaining a ruling on the Motion to Reconsider, appellants filed a

Notice of Appeal, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction?
2.

Was the claimed error in the jury voir dire so obvious and harmful, it reached the

level of "plain error" when the claim is based upon pre-trial publicity about the defendant
hospital and appellants' counsel passed the jury for cause?

When appellants filed their Notice of Appeal, that action divested the trial court of
jurisdiction. Therefore, that trial court had no authority to entertain Appellants' Motion for

Reconsideration on the issues it raised. "[T]he concept of plain error . . . allows an appellate
court to reach the merits of a claim raised for the first time on appeal." Steele v. Bd. of Rev.
of Indus. Com'n, 845 P.2d 960, 962 n.2 (Utah App. 1993).
Appellants claim that if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider their Motion for
Reconsideration, the standard of review would be an abuse of discretion, based on the courts
denial of Appellants' Motion for a New Trial. (Appellants' Brief p. 2). However, Appellants'
Brief does not address Appellants' Motion for a New Trial in the issues it presents. The only
issue presented for review by appellant is whether the jury voir dire was adequate based upon
exposure to pre-trial publicity. (Appellants' Brief p. 1). This issue was only in Appellants'
Motion for Reconsideration and appellant has refused to characterize its Motion for
Reconsideration as another Motion for a New Trial. (Appellants' Brief p. 28). In either event,
this appeal is subject to a "plain error" standard of review because appellants' counsel passed
the jury for cause. State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1994) (R. 617). (See
Exhibit A attached and by this reference made a part hereof).
The first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error
be "plain", i.e., from our examination of the record we must be
able to say that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it
was committing error, (citations omitted). The second and
somewhat interrelated requirement for finding of plain error is that
the error affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the
error be harmful.
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989). Even if the court concludes that the
trial court made an obvious error, it need "not reverse unless [the party] demonstrates that,
2

absent the error, there is a sufficient likelihood of a different result." State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d
at 821. This means a substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the challenging
party. Id. at 822.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
This court's interpretation of the following rules and statute as they affect the jurisdiction
of the trial court and the tolling of the time for appeal will have an impact on those issues in this
case.
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b):
Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any
party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to
amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is
granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4)
under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties
shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion . . . A notice of appeal
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have
no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial
court disposing of the motion as provided above.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b):
Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, an/or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express

determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay
3

and upon an express direction for the entry ot judgment In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates tewer
than all the claims or the nghts and liabilities of claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims
and the nghts and liabilities of all the parties
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b):
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence which by due
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to
appear in said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application, or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons, (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more
than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision Co) does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action (Emphasis
added.)

4

Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3):
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and
obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the case.
This is an alleged malpractice claim brought against Dr. Robert O. Murray and the Grand

County Service Area, dba Allen Memorial Hospital, by appellants for the death of their child,
two hours after birth. (R. 1-4). Appellants dismissed their claims against defendant Robert O.
Murray and continued their action against the hospital. (R. 20-21). The parties went to trial
in this posture.
n.

Course of proceedings and disposition.
At the conclusion of a five day trial, the jury entered a verdict of no cause of action

against defendant Allen Memorial Hospital.

(R. 418-20).

(Exhibit B). Appellants filed a

Motion for a New Trial based on jury bias, which was denied by the court. (R. 431-39; 45758). Appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying their Motion for a New
Trial. (R. 504-5). This Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the court. (R. 534-39).
Before the trial court ruled on Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, appellants filed their
Notice of Appeal. (R. 529).

5

III.

Statement of facts.
1.

Appellant Michele Davis contacted her attorney John Black and informed him of

her concerns for obtaining a fair trial in Moab because "everyone knows everyone". (R. 48586). (Exhibit C).
2.

On August 17, 1993 appellant Michele Davis sent her attorney another letter

showing a "fear of having a trial take place in Moab". (R. 487-88). (Exhibit D).
3.

No motion for change of venue was ever filed with the court and appellants

retained their attorney up to and throughout the trial. (R. 159, 239).
4.

During jury voir dire, after defense counsel's objections, the court changed the

words on No. 11 and 12 of Appellants' Proposed Voir Dire Questions from "about" to "for or
against". (R. 550, 553). The court disallowed questions No. 17 and 20 (R. 553, 261-62) and
questions No. 25 and 28. (R. 558, 262-63, 398) (See Exhibit E for Appellants' Proposed Voir
Dire Questions and the court's minute entry).
5.

Appellants' counsel noted no exception to the court's ruling on voir dire.
THE COURT: Any exceptions to be noted, Mr. Black?
MR. BLACK, JR.: No, your Honor. (R. 555). (Exhibit F).

6.

The court asked all of Appellants' Proposed Voir Dire Questions that had been

allowed except No. 13 regarding the magazines to which jurors subscribed. The questions asked
included whether or not the parties had been sued or had brought a suit against anyone (R. 609),

whether the jurors had feelings for or against someone bringing a lawsuit against their doctor
6

or hospital (R. 610), and whether any juror acquired any information about the parties which
would bias them for or against any of the parties (R. 600). (Exhibit G; See also, Index of
Questions Asked, Exhibit H).
7.

A number of jurors were excused for cause during the voir dire, based upon

objections by counsel for both sides. (R. 398, 574, 577, 584, 587, 593). (Exhibit I).
8.

Appellants' counsel made no objection to the court when the court did not ask

question No. 13 regarding magazine subscriptions.
THE COURT: Any-anything that I've skipped over, gentlemen?
MR. BLACK, SR.: I can't think of anything that your Honor has
missed. (R. 611). (Exhibit J).
9.

Both counsel for appellant and appellee passed the jury for cause.
THE COURT: Oh, thank you. And I will. Mr.-Do you pass the
jury for cause at this time, Mr.—
MR. BLACK, JR.: We do your Honor.
MR. JEFFS: We pass the jury for cause your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. (R. 617). (Exhibit A).

10.

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendant Allen Memorial Hospital for no

cause of action. (R. 418-20) (Exhibit B).
11.

Of all the newspaper articles submitted by appellants in the their brief regarding

the defendant Allen Memorial Hospital, only the one dated September 23, 1993 (misdated in
Appellants' Brief p. 8 as September 19), makes any reference to the cost of malpractice suits

(R. 497). (Exhibit K). In the last paragraph of that article, it notes that senior citizens who
attended the luncheon, which is the subject of this article, had several concerns about the
hospital, including rising costs due to malpractice suits, need for local insurance, high
staff-to-patient ratios, low patient occupancy, lack of information to the public, the need for a
hospital, and the possibility of part of Moab City's local sales tax being earmarked for health
care. (Exhibit K).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case should be reviewed under a "plain error" standard because the Appellants'
Notice of Appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the Appellants' Motion for
Reconsideration. This is the general rule the Utah courts have recognized. The courts have
fashioned a number of exceptions to this rule; however, appellants' case fits within none of these
exceptions. The exceptions include motions made under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
60(b), 54(b), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), and Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3).
Though U.R.A.P. 4(b) refers to "any other such motion", this phrase references motions that
are the functional equivalent of the exceptions listed above. If a party's motion does not fall
within the functional equivalent of one of these motions, then Notice of Appeal divests the trial
court of jurisdiction, and the time for appeal is not tolled.
"Plain error" is also the appropriate standard of review in this case because counsel for
appellant passed the jury for cause during the voir dire of the jury. Counsel also declined to
provide the trial court with any further questions for voir dire when the trial court requested him
8

to do so. Though appellants claim that they are entitled to an "abuse of discretion" standard of
review if this court holds that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider the Motion for
Reconsideration, appellants have not raised any of the issues from their Motion for a New Trial
in this appeal. Therefore, the correct standard of review, no matter what the jurisdictional
posture this court decides is appropriate, is "plain error".
Appellants' claims that pre-trial publicity biased the jury are unsubstantiated and
insufficient to establish actual prejudice. This court would have to engage in speculation and
numerous leaps of logic in order to reach the conclusion appellants pray for.
The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in conducting the voir dire of the
jury panel. The questioning in the area of tort reform publicity is subject to a two-tier approach
in which the court is precluded from asking further questions if the prospective jurors do not
respond in the affirmative to the threshold question.

In this case, the trial court asked the

appropriate threshold question and received no affirmative responses. Under a "totality of the
questioning" standard, the trial court also asked many other questions that allowed appellants to
intelligently exercise their challenges to the jury panel.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

Appellants' Notice of Appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to consider
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration.
A.

Under the general rule, a Notice of Appeal divests the lower court of
jurisdiction.

Appellants claim this court and the court of appeals have issued conflicting opinions
regarding the issue of jurisdiction after a Notice of Appeal has been filed. (Appellants' Brief
p. 13, 15). Appellants make this claim, apparently on the basis of different results obtained in
the cases of White v. State. 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990), Hurt v. Hurt. 793 P.2d 948 (Utah App.
1990), Peay v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980), and Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). Appellants claim that because the trial court was divested of jurisdiction
in White and allowed to retain jurisdiction in Hurt, there is an irreconcilable conflict which the
court must now resolve.

(Appellants' Brief p. 13). Appellants claim the same conflict in

comparing Peay and Watkiss as to when a Motion for Reconsideration will toll a time for
appeal. (Appellants' Brief p. 15). In fact, under a more complete analysis, there is no conflict
between these cases and they are all reconcilable.
Appellants correctly state that the general rule has been that "an appeal divests the trial
courts of jurisdiction and transfers jurisdiction to the appellate court where it remains until the
appellate proceeding terminates and the trial court regains jurisdiction." White v. State, 795
P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1990). In the case at bar, appellants filed a Notice of Appeal after the trial
court had denied their Motion for a New Trial and they had subsequently filed a Motion for
10

Reconsideration, but had not yet received a ruling on that latter motion. Under the language of
the general rule, this Notice of Appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on their
Motion for Reconsideration.

Therefore, any errors they claimed in that Motion for

Reconsideration have not been appropriately addressed by the trial court and are heard for the
first time by the appellate court.
B.

Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration does not fall within the recognized
exceptions to the general rule that a Notice of Appeal divests the trial court
of jurisdiction.

As with most general rules, the courts have fashioned a number of exceptions to the
general rule referred to above that a Notice of Appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. The
case law in Utah has developed exceptions in four major areas. These exceptions fall under
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(b), and Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(3). All of the cases provided by appellant
either come within one of these exceptions and the lower court retains jurisdiction, thus tolling
the time for an appeal, or they fall outside of these delineated exceptions, the lower court is
divested of jurisdiction, and the time for appeal is not tolled.

Appellants' Motion for

Reconsideration does not fall within any of the above exceptions and therefore, the lower court
was divested of jurisdiction and the time within which appellant might appeal was not tolled.
1.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

Both this court and the Utah Court of Appeals have considered this issue and ruled that
the "trial court has jurisdiction to consider a 60(b) motion while an appeal is pending." Baker
11

v. Western Surety Company, 757 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah App. 1988). The Utah Court of Appeals
recognized that this approach allows the trial court to better recognize a frivolous 60(b) motion
and to evaluate the merits of the motion more quickly, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals. Id.
The court outlined the procedure to be followed if the district court found the 60(b) motion to
be without merit. The district court may enter an order denying the motion and the parties could
appeal that order; however, if the trial court granted the motion then a brief memorandum to that
effect to the appellate court would be appropriate to request an order of remand. Id.
This court adopted The Utah Court of Appeal's reasoning in recognizing that exceptions
to the general rule were necessary to prevent unnecessary delay, "where any action by the trial
court is not likely to modify a party's rights with respect to the issues raised on appeal". White
v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990).
2.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)

This court also recognized in White v. State, supra, at 650, that "where the trial court
has, pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b) certified as final a judgment against one
party in a multi-party action, the remainder of the action remains in the trial court as not
necessarily affected by the appeal. In that case, the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with
the claims remaining unadjudicated." (Emphasis added). The court in that case refers to an
earlier case, Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333, 1334 (1984), in which it explains the relationship
of Rule 54(b) to the rights of appeal.

12

However, the entry of such a final judgment does not affect the
ability of the district court to proceed with respect to the remainder
of the claims and/or parties. Similarly when an appeal is taken
from such a judgment, it only brings before this court that portion
of the action with respect to which the judgment has been entered;
the rest of the action remains in the trial court and is not
necessarily affected by the appeal.
The court noted in that case that this was a sensible rule, or otherwise, where numerous
claims or parties were joined it would "automatically stop all proceedings until the appeal had
run its course. The potential for unnecessary delay is obvious." Id.
This court also interpreted a Motion to Reconsider a summary judgment to be viable
under Rule 54(b). In that case, the court relied on Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors.
761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988), "in looking beyond the procedural question to the merits, i.e,
the potential for a different outcome if the motion to reconsider were granted."

Timm v.

Dewsnup. 851 P.2d 1178, 1185 (Utah 1993). The court also recognized that it had previously
held that Rule 54(b) permits reconsideration of a non-final judgment "since it facilitates the just
and speedy resolution of disputes in the trial court." Id. (citing Kennedy v. New Era Indus..
Inc.. 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979).
3.

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)

Appellants correctly recognize the significance of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)
and the interpretation of "any other such motion." However, this phrase does not create the
dilemma appellants claim. (Appellants' Brief p. 15-16). In the case of Watkiss & Campbell v.
Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1991), this court recognized that Foa's pleading entitled
13

"Exception to Order and Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment" was treated by the
lower court as a motion for a new trial, and on that basis the court felt that it tolled the time
period to file on appeal. The basis for this determination was "any other such motion" in Utah
Rule of Appellate Civil Procedure 4(b). Id. at 1063. This court further recognized that there
is no motion to reconsider a trial court's order of judgment, because of the concerns expressed
in Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), particularly a need for finality of
judgments and orders. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d at 1064. Nevertheless,
because Foa's motion was in essence, a motion for a new trial the court recognized that it was
"like" the motions in Rule 4(b) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

The court also

recognized that "[tjreating the motion to reconsider as a motion for a new trial eliminates the
fears expressed in Drury". Id. at 1065 n. 11. Because the effect of the motion was essentially
the same as an appropriate motion, i.e., under Rule 59, the court allowed it. Likewise, in
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah App. 1991), because the party's objection to the
judgment was the "functional equivalent" to a Rule 60(b) motion, the court used Rule 60(b) to
vacate its judgment. When the substance of a mislabeled motion is in essence the same as an
appropriate motion, courts can use the rule to grant relief. Kunzler v. O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270,
274 (Utah App. 1993).
In this case, appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the trial court and the trial
court interpreted that motion as the "functional equivalent" of an amended motion for a new
trial. The trial court ruling, in the case at bar, analyzed that motion under a Rule 59 analysis,
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as well as a Rule 60(b) analysis. (R. 534-38). (Exhibit L). Both of these rules have been held
as exceptions to the general rule that a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction.
However, appellants reject the trial court's characterization of their motion as either an amended
motion for a new trial or a Rule 60(b) motion. (Appellants' Brief p. 28). Appellants seek an
abuse of discretion standard of review, which would be appropriate if they were appealing from
their Motion for a New Trial. See Moonlake Electric Association, Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western
Constructors. Inc., (Utah App. 1988) (trial courts ruling on a motion for a new trial will be
disturbed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion). However, though appellants filed a Notice
of Appeal after the trial court denied their initial Motion for a New Trial, appellants do not
address any issues from their Motion for a New Trial in their brief.

They also refuse to

characterize their Motion for Reconsideration as a Motion for a New Trial.
Appellants claim that the trial court incorrectly applied a "newly discovered evidence
standard" because of its Rule 59 New Trial motion and Rule 60(b) analysis. (Appellants' Brief
p. 28-29). However, the court in its ruling, recognized the concern for finality of decisions and
only proceeded to consider Appellants1 Motion for Reconsideration because they had filed their
original Motion for a New Trial pro se. (R. 534). (Exhibit L). It was on that basis that the
trial judge gave some deference to appellants and treated their motion as an amended motion for
a new trial though he included a 60(b) analysis as well, out of an abundance of caution. (R.
535).

(Exhibit L).

Had the court not characterized the motion for reconsideration in this

fashion, it would have had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion.
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Even as an amended motion for a new trial, the court's jurisdiction is tenuous at best.
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that an "order denying the party's initial motion for a new
trial was the final appealable order of the trial court. That order fully and finally disposed of
the claims and assertions of the [other party] and the trial court was 'without power to alter its
prior ruling upon the subsequent filing of what is in essence the same motion ,, \

State v.

McMullen. 764 P.2d 634, 635 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Tracy v. The University of Utah
Hospital, 619 P.2d 340, 342 (1980).

This is the reasoning behind the ruling in Drury v.

Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966), reiterated in Peay v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841, 843
(Utah 1980), where the court noted that a Motion for Reconsideration was an attempt to
"persuade the judge to reverse himself . . . and he should not be in the position of having the
further duty of acting as a court of review upon his own ruling."
In this case, appellants filed a Motion for a New Trial and it was denied. (R. 457).
Such denial was a final appealable order of the trial court and the trial court was without power
to alter that ruling. Appellants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but refuse to characterize
it as the "functional equivalent" of any motion which would appropriately toll the time for
appeal.
4.

Utah Code Annotated 30-3-5(3).
maintenance of the parties

Continuing jurisdiction for support and

Appellants claim that there is a conflict between the cases of White v. State, supra, and
Hurt v. Hurt, supra, because this court in White states the general rule that the trial court is
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divested of jurisdiction after a Notice of Appeal and the appeals court in Hurt declares that the
trial court retains jurisdiction to take necessary action, even when an appeal is pending.
(Appellants' Brief p. 13). However, appellants ignore the fact that in White v. State itself the
court recognized that district courts have continuing jurisdiction after entry of a final divorce
decree to adjudicate petitions to modify "since the petition for modification is collateral to the
divorce decree". White v. State, supra, at 650. The decision in Hurt v. Hurt was based upon
a petition to modify child support obligations of the defendant.

The appellate court noted

correctly that the trial court was "clearly not without jurisdiction to enter that judgment" because
it retains jurisdiction to take "necessary action" even when "an appeal is pending". Hurt v.
Hurt, supra, at 951. The court also noted that this is the case, even if the trial court action
might moot the appeal. Id. (citing Cingolani v. Utah Power & Light. 790 P.2d 129 (Utah App.
1990)).
The distinction between what causes of action require an appeal and those which retain
continuing jurisdiction in the district court in divorce cases is made clear in the case of Peters
v. Peters. 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P.2d 71 (1964). This court noted that "the main judgment is
a final and appealable judgment as to the issues therein dealt with." However, there is,
another aspect of a divorce proceeding which is entirely different.
After the main judgment is entered life goes on and the needs of
the spouses and children and the duties to fulfill them continue day
after day. In order to take care of these needs it is essential that
the trial court have continuing jurisdiction to enforce the rights of
the parties. Id. at 417.
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Further the court noted that:
There is no good reason why not and every good reason why that
court should and does have continuing jurisdiction in the action
over the family's continuing problems to protect the rights and
interests of the parties. That this is true and was so recognized by
the legislature is indicated in Section 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953. Id.
The court also recognized that "subsequent changes or new orders which must be based
on changed circumstances obviously could only be made by the court in supplemental
proceedings" where fact finding could be accomplished. Id.
The trial court retains jurisdiction to take necessary action in a case when an appeal is
pending when that necessary action is related to modification of child support or spouse
maintenance or custody as defined in Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5. That rule is not contrary to the
general rule but a clearly defined exception under which appellants' case clearly does not apply.
C.

A Motion for Reconsideration does not toll the time for appeal unless it is the
functional equivalent of an appropriate motion.

The Utah Courts have long followed, as well as recently recognized, the fact that there
is no motion to reconsider under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Kunzler v. O'DelL supra,
at 274, (Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for any such motion); Utah State
Employees Credit Unions v. Riding. 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 (1970) (we think the motion
to vacate the judgment is abortive under the rules). The reasoning behind this position is based
on the case of Drury v. Lunceford, supra, mentioned above, in which this court noted if a
Motion for Reconsideration were allowed "why should not the other party who is now ruled
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against be permitted to make a Motion for Reconsideration". The court in Drury further noted
that the rules of procedure were designed to provide a pattern of regularity which the courts and
parties could rely on.

It also noted that "practical expediency demands that there be some

finality to the actions of the court." Id. See also, Maverick Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial
Commission of Utah, 860 P.2d 944, 950 (Utah App. 1993) (creating another layer of appeal
would allow mischievous counsel to use the right to reconsideration as a tool for needless and
in some cases harmful delay); Ring v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 744 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah
App. 1987) (petitioner is entitled to "one bite of the apple" on review . . . that opportunity
cannot be expanded into a multi-course buffet by such devices as reconsideration).

Should

motions for reconsideration be allowed, this court recognized that "tenacious litigants and
lawyers might persist in motions, arguments and pressures and theoretically [this might go on]
ad infinitum." Maverick Country Stores. Inc., 860 P.2d at 952 (quoting Watkiss & Campbell
v. Foa & Son, supra, at 1064, (alteration in original).
In Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors. 761 P.2d 42, 44 (1988), this court
recognized that though a motion to reconsider was not expressly available under the rules, Rule
54(b) did allow for the possibility of a judge changing his or her mind in cases involving
multiple parties or multiple claims. However, in that case they denied the motion based on the
"law of the case" doctrine because no new legal theories or new material evidence was
introduced.

In this case, this trial court's memorandum decision on the Motion for

Reconsideration addresses the issue of new legal theories or material evidence under the Rule
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59 analysis and concludes that appellants' "new evidence" with regard to the pre-trial publicity
was insufficient to alter the verdict. (R. 435-37). (Exhibit L).
Appellants correctly note that this court in Peay v. Peay, supra, at 843, held that a "party
cannot extend the time for filing an appeal simply by filing a 'Motion for Reconsideration'".
However, appellants neglected to analyze the context in which that holding was made. In the
Peay case, the defendant originally filed a motion to modify the divorce decree pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §30-3-5. Alternatively they asked that the decree be vacated and set aside. The
lower court granted his modification and struck the motion to vacate and set aside. Id. at 842.
The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order striking the petition and motion
for relief of final judgment. This court recognized that the defendant's request for relief was
fully satisfied when his Motion for Modification was granted and his alternative claim became
moot.

However, it analyzed the motion to reconsider and held that they were without

jurisdiction to rule upon the merits, but only because he had filed his Notice of Appeal untimely.
Id. at 843. The striking of the motion to vacate does not fall within the exceptions to the
general rule that appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Therefore, the time for appeal was
not tolled and the court correctly noted that a "party cannot extend the time for filing an appeal
simply by filing a motion for reconsideration". Id. Likewise in Tracy v. University of Utah
Hospital, 619 P.2d 340 (1980) the court identified petitioner's motion to reconsider as, in
essence, a second motion to intervene and held that the Rules of Civil Procedure "make no
provision for such a motion as that of 'reconsideration'". Id. at 342. A motion for intervention
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does not fall within on^ of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that a notice of appeal
divests the trial court of jurisdiction.
If a motion is not identifiable under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court will look to
its "functional equivalent" and when the substance of the mislabeled motion is, in essence, the
same as an appropriate motion, the courts can use the rule to grant relief. Kunzler v. O'Delh
supra, at 274. The title of a motion is not dispositive. In the Kunzler case, the court held the
appellees' motion to clarify the trial court's original order was the "functional equivalent" of the
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion. On that basis, the court allowed a motion to be
heard and ruled upon under Rule 60(b) analysis. Id. at 273.
In this case, appellants have filed a Motion for Reconsideration based upon the claim of
plain error and the authority of courts to enact justice. There is no such motion recognized
under the rules and therefore, such a motion does not toll the time for appeal.

The only

exception to this would be if appellants' motion was the functional equivalent of an appropriate
rule identifiable under the Rules of Civil Procedure which would toll the time for appeal.
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration does not come within any of the recognized exceptions
to the general rule that a Notice of Appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Appellants have
created a new motion which is unrecognizable and inappropriate in the trial court.

The

appropriate forum for a claim of "plain error" is the appellate court. Therefore, appellants' first
appeal was timely and appropriate as the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear Appellants'
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Motion for Reconsideration. The second appeal was unnecessary, as the time was not tolled
when appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

EL

The voir dire of prospective jurors was sufficient to allow counsel to intelligently
evaluate the jurors.
A.

The standard of review when counsel passes the jury for cause is "plain
error".

Appellants maintain that if the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter their order denying
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, they are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of
review. (Appellants' Brief p. 2). Appellee has already argued that the trial court was divested
of jurisdiction after the appellants filed their Notice of Appeal; however, even if the court should
hold that the trial court was not divested of jurisdiction, the standard of review in this case
would remain "plain error".

As mentioned above in the section on Issues and Standard of

Review, supra, p. 2, appellants have not appealed the trial court's denial of a new trial. They
have not addressed any of the issues in their Motion for a New Trial and are not entitled to an
abuse of discretion standard on that basis.
Even if the above was not true, appellants are still subject to a plain error standard of
review since their counsel passed the jury for cause. (R. 617). State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818,
821 (Utah App. 1994). The Utah Appellate Court has noted that if counsel had
challenged the jurors for cause our standard of review . . . would
be an abuse of discretion. The more stringent standard of plain
error is appropriate when there was no challenge by counsel,
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because of our inability, on appeal, to view the jurors and assess
their potential bias. Only those present, the court and counsel,
have that advantaged view. That notion also buttresses our view
that defense counsel reasonably exercised professional judgment as
to trial strategy in each of these instances and consciously did not
challenge for cause. State v. Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 177 (Utah
App. 1992).
In this case, appellants not only passed the jury for cause, they informed the judge upon
his request, that the court had not forgotten to ask any questions.
THE COURT: Any-anything that I've skipped over, gentlemen?
MR. BLACK, SR.: I can't think of anything that your Honor has
missed.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you Mr. Black. Mr. Jeffs?
MR. JEFFS: No. (R. 611-12). (Exhibit J).
Appellants cannot even claim that the court would have been unwilling to answer further
questions at appellants' request. Earlier in the voir dire proceeding the court asked defense
counsel if there were any questions he wished the court to make and counsel for the defense
made a request which the court promptly complied with.
THE COURT: I--I think that, Mr. Jeffs, that Fve-fairly well
handled the remainder of your requested requests and unless you
have some specific inquiry that you wish for me to make.
MR. JEFFS: You may be going to ask this question already. I
wanted to know if any of them, a close member of their family,
immediate family or close acquaintance has had a--the birth of a
premature child or premature birth and whether that would affect
their ability to be fair and impartial.
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THE COURT:
Have—any of the potential jurors had an
experience or had a close acquaintance have a experience with a
premature birth? Let me ask it that way. Let's start up here. (R.
605, 606). (Exhibit M).
It is inconceivable that a party who has failed to remind the judge of unanswered
questions when asked, and additionally passed a jury for cause, could claim any error in the voir
dire process.

The court asked counsel for additional questions, and counsel neglected to

respond. Additionally, appellants' counsel clearly passed the jury for cause.
Under a plain error standard, "an error requires reversal when it is 'plain' i.e., obvious
to the trial court and also harmful, i.e., affects the substantial rights of the accused." Ong Intern
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447, 459 (1993). The court need not
reverse unless it determines an error existed that was both obvious and harmful. State v. Olsen,
869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994). Appellants cannot rely on an alleged objection raised
in a bench conference that was not preserved on the record. Id.
B,

Appellant presents no evidence that pre-trial publicity prejudiced the jury.

Appellants claim that the pre-trial publicity regarding appellee, Allen Memorial Hospital,
prejudiced the jury to the extent that there could have been a more favorable outcome otherwise.
However, it is unclear whether the more favorable outcome would have occurred absent the
publicity, if the trial court had been moved to another venue, or if appellants' counsel had been
allowed to ask additional questions on the voir dire (even though counsel had that opportunity
and declined). (R. 611).
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Appellants spend pages of their brief detailing the pre-trial publicity over a one year
penod to which the prospective jurors could have been exposed. (Appellants' Brief p. 21-24).
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that evidence of the pervasiveness of pre-trial publicity is
not enough to answer the question of whether the jury was fair and impartial. State v. Caver,
814 P.2d 604, 609 (Utah App. 1991). "The fact that some jurors had knowledge of the case
from media accounts is not sufficient by itself to establish prejudice." Id. at 610. A party must
show that they are "actually prejudiced".

State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah App.

1994). These cases also indicate that the remedy for pervasive pre-trial publicity would be a
request for a change of venue, which never occurred in this case.
In Appellants' Brief and the earlier Motion for Reconsideration, appellants indicated with
great specificity the claimed pervasiveness of pre-trial publicity regarding appellee, Allen
Memorial Hospital. (Appellants' Brief p. 21-24 and Appellants' Addendum Exhibit A). This
publicity was not related to the appellants' case with appellee, Allen Memorial Hospital, but only
concerned the financial condition of the hospital in general. Appellants claim that because the
trial court concluded that "the information was available" and could have been known to the
appellants with reasonable diligence, this inescapably leads to the conclusion that the court and
jury were aware of the publicity and such awareness constituted plain error. (Appellants' Brief
p. 28 n.6). Unlike appellants, the court and jurors are not under any obligation of reasonable
diligence to produce or acknowledge the pre-trial publicity. Even if the publicity was arguably
obvious, that is no indication that the existence of the publicity created obvious error. Whether
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or not the publicity could have been known to the trial court or the jury it is not dispositive of
plain error, as claimed in Appellants' Brief.
Appellant also claims that the trial court's refusal to allow certain questions during voir
dire precluded them from determining the impact of any publicity on the prospective jurors.
(Appellants' Brief p. 30-31). However, the trial court specifically addressed this issue when it
asked the prospective jurors, "Have any of you acquired any information about the plaintiffs or
the defendants which would—bias you either for or against Mr. and Mrs. Davis, the Allen
Memorial Hospital or Dr. Murray? If anyone has acquired any information would they raise
their hand? I see that no hands are raised." (R. 600). (Exhibit G).
Appellants are unable to demonstrate that the pre-trial publicity regarding appellee Allen
Memorial Hospital prejudiced the jury.

There is no obvious error since no juror even

acknowledge it had acquired any information regarding any of the parties which they believed
would give them cause for bias. Appellants also produced no evidence that the alleged error was
harmful, i.e., that there was a substantial likelihood the outcome would have been different.
State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994). In fact, the trial court, in its ruling
recognized this failing when it held,
Their attempt to connect the publicity blitz to their claim of
prejudice fails because any number of possible alternatives to their
explanation of the verdict is equally as likely an explanation and
the most likely is that the jurors concluded that the doctor and the
hospital had done all things possible under the circumstances.
(Emphasis added). (R. 536-37). (Exhibit L).
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The case that appellants cite for support of their argument refer to tort reform publicity.
(Appellants' Brief p. 26-33). If appellants are basing their argument of error on the fact that
this publicity prejudiced the jury by raising concerns of so-called "tort reform", their argument
is equally thin.

In fact, of all of the articles submitted by appellants only one makes any

reference to rising costs due to malpractice lawsuits. (R. 497). (Exhibit K). As noted in the
statement of facts above, that article refers to senior citizens at a luncheon who voice concern
over several issues including malpractice suits, local insurance, high staff to patient ratios, low
hospital occupancy, lack of information and even the need for a hospital. Appellants' statement
in their brief that "at those meetings attendees express concern that costs of medical care are
increasing due to malpractice suits" is an overstatement. (Appellants' Brief p. 22). In fact, only
this one article refers to any such concerns.
Appellants also claim that the "Grand County citizens were barraged with threats the
hospital would close if the tax increased failed". (Appellants' Brief p. 22). Whether or not the
Grand County citizens were "barraged" with such threats, the fact is that they voted down the
requested tax increase. (R. 536). Therefore, it is pure speculation to now conclude that the jury
voted no cause of action against the hospital because the hospital might close. Appellants base
their argument of prejudice on an article included in their brief on page 23. However, nothing
in this article refers to the costs of malpractice suits as being any source of the hospital's
problems. This article does describe the hospital's search for two doctors to set up a practice

in 1994 and questions if the hospital has been run responsibly. Appellants have isolated one
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issue, fear of possible closure of the hospital, and claim it is the likely reason the jurors
rendered a verdict of no cause against appellee hospital. To reach that conclusion, this court
would have to leap through several steps in logic. It must assume, first, that the jurors read the
articles in question and remembered them; second, that the jurors cared or were concerned that
the hospital would close; third, that the closure of the hospital would affect them in a meaningful
way; and finally, if all of the above were true, that belief would affect their verdict in this case,
i.e., that they believed rendering a verdict against the hospital would, in fact, close the hospital.
Even if the court were inclined to make these leaps of logic, the trial court's voir dire precludes
getting past the first step, since it asked the prospective jurors if they had acquired any
information about the parties which would bias them. (R. 600). (Exhibit G). In any event,
such mental gymnastics hardly meets the standard of "obviousness" required for plain error.
C.

The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in the voir dire of
prospective jurors.

Though appellee believes "plain error" is the appropriate standard of review in this case,
it recognizes this court may consider the issues raised under an abuse of discretion standard.
However, even under such a standard, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
conducting the voir dire of the jury panel. The cases that appellant relies on refer only to tort
reform publicity and appellee has already pointed out the lack of that type of information in the
publicity appellants have submitted. Therefore, it is questionable whether such analysis is even
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applicable to this case. However, for purposes of refuting appellants1 claims, appellee provides
the following argument.
"This court will overturn the trial court's discretionary rejection of voir dire questions
only upon a showing that the 'abuse of discretion rose to the level of reversible error'". State
v. Hall. 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App.) {cert, denied 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990)) (cited in
Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96,98 (Utah App. 1993)). "A trial court commits reversible error
when 'considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate
opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors'". Barrett v. Peterson, 858 P.2d
at 98. (alteration in original).
The court makes clear in both Barrett v. Peterson, supra, and Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d
460 (Utah App. 1992), the voir dire questioning in this area is subject to a two-tier approach.
This approach is designed to "balance the conflicting interests of selecting an impartial jury and
the prejudice infused into the proceedings by the questioning about exposure to tort reform
information". Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d at 99.
In the Barrett case, the plaintiff was concerned about specific articles which had appeared
in national magazines to which the jurors may have been exposed. Id- Likewise, in this case
appellants claim concern regarding the prospective jurors' possible exposure to numerous
specific articles in the local newspaper. The court in Barrett explained that plaintiff must first
demonstrate the potential jurors are likely to have been exposed to such material by
demonstrating the subject articles were recently published in widely read media.
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Assuming

appellants had, arguably, demonstrated this (though no evidence of circulation, etc. was
presented), after that initial showing, the party is entitled to ask either of the following first-tier
questions:
(1) Whether the prospective juror has heard of or read anything
(not necessarily related to insurance) which might affect his ability
to sit as an impartial juror . . .; or (2) Whether the prospective
juror regularly reads any of the magazines or newspapers in which
it has been demonstrated that the insurance advertisements and
articles had appeared . . . if any juror answers these inquiries
affirmatively the plaintiff is entitled to proceed to more specific
second-tier questions concerning tort reform." Id;. See also.
Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d at 466.
In this case, the trial court clearly complied with this direction by asking the prospective
jurors whether they had acquired any information about any of the parties involved in this suit
and if this information would bias them for or against any of the parties. (R. 600, Exhibit G).
The court, in Barrett, noted that, depending on the response to these inquiries further questions
can be pursued, subject to the trial court's discretion. Barrett v. Peterson, supra, at 100.
In Barrett, the appellate court noted that "none of the questions asked by the trial court
even remotely addressed whether the prospective jurors had heard or read anything related to
tort reform issues. Nor did the trial court attempt to address in a more general fashion the
issues of medical negligence and tort reform propaganda in its voir dire questioning". Id. at
102. In this case, not only did the trial court ask the question described above but it also asked
questions regarding medical negligence, and jurors' concern for lawsuits in general and suits
against their doctor or hospital, in particular. (R. 609, 610) (Exhibit G, Exhibit H).
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Even if this court determines that the trial court should have allowed additional
questioning during voir dire, the failure to ask an appropriate question "does not always
constitute an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. We only reverse if 'considering the totality
of the questioning counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information
necessary to evaluate jurors'". Evans v. Doty, supra, at 468 (quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d
439, 448 (Utah 1988)). In the Evans case, the appellate court noted that under this "totality of
the questioning" standard, the trial court had asked many questions that would have allowed
plaintiff "to intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges, including an inquiry into the jurors'
occupations, background and feelings about medical malpractice in general." Id. The court
further noted that the trial court had excused two potential jurors because of their claim that they
could not be impartial. Id.
In this case as well, the trial court asked many questions inquiring into the jurors'
occupations, backgrounds and feelings about medical malpractice in general (Exhibit H). The
trial court also excused a number of jurors whose answers indicated they may have trouble being
impartial. (R. 398, 574, 577, 584, 587, 593) (Exhibit E, Exhibit I). Therefore, under the
totality of the questioning, the trial court did not commit reversible error nor abuse its discretion
in conducting its voir dire of this case.
Appellants also claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded appellees
had failed to show any connection between attitudes the jury may have had and their finding of

no cause of action against appellee, Allen Memorial Hospital. (R. 535-36). Appellants conclude
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that the language in the memorandum decision "assumes the jury's failure to reach the issue of
damages shows the jury was not prejudice by the hospitals pre-trial publicity blitz". (Appellants'
Brief p. 29). Appellants cite to Evans v. Doty, for support of this argument.
First, the trial court's memorandum does not conclude that the jury's failure to award
damages indicates no connection between any prejudice the jury may have had and the pre-trial
publicity.

What the ruling states is that plaintiffs fail to show any connection between the

publicity and any verdict the jury may have reached.
Second, in the Evans case, the court rejected the analysis in the Montana case of
Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), in which that court held "a biased jury
would manifest their bias by first finding liability and then improperly limiting the damage
award", because the facts of Yost were distinguishable from those in Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d
at 468. In Yost the parties were dealing with a "very specific and unique situation-the direct
impact of an identifiable and contemporaneous nationwide advertising campaign on potential
jurors". Id. In Evans, the plaintiff was more concerned about jurors' general feelings about tort
reform and therefore, the appellate court refused to accept the Yost analysis.

In this case,

appellants' claim is based upon a claimed specific identifiable campaign directed at the potential
jurors. Therefore, the analysis in Evans case in not controlling in this matter. The trial court
asked the threshold questions recommended for inquiries concerning specific tort reform
campaigns and therefore did not abuse its discretion in the manner in which it conducted the voir
dire.
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CONCLUSION
"The constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the
community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on
the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to
apply the facts of the particular case." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 390 (Utah 1993)
Beginning from the premise that the jurors are presumed impartial, the function of the
voir dire is to expose any bias or prejudice for counsel so that they may exercise their challenges
for cause and peremptory challenges. Barrett v. Peterson, supra, at 98

In this case, under

either a "plain error" or "abuse of discretion standard", the tnal court clearly conducted the voir
dire in an appropriate manner. Appellees respectfully request this court to affirm the decision
of the court below.
Respectfully submitted this / /

day of September, 1994.
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF

EXHIBIT A

1

during this little break.

2

MR. JEFFS:

And the Court hasn't called for it, but

3

I assume that before that:- recess, the Court ought to call for

4

whether there are any--whether the jury is passed for cause.

5

THE COURT:

6

Mr.--do you pass the jury for cause at this time,

7

Oh.

Thank you.

And I will.

Mr.--

8

MR. BLACK, JR.:

9

MR. JEFFS:

We pass the jury for cause, your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

Thank you.

11

I don't even have to give them an instruction, do I?

12

Not this time. Next time you get an instruction, but go ahead

13

and take a stretch break and we'll come back and I'll--oh,

14

let's see, gee.

15

going to--we're not only going to take a stretch break, we're

16

going

17

already, so we'll excuse the jury to--to go and have lunch,

18

return here--will 1:30 give you sufficient time to--to have

19

lunch and get back here and kind of check in on your family

20

and tell your boss that you might be gone for five days

21

instead of one?

22

23 I

to

take

We do, your Honor.

I didn't see what time it is.

a lunch break;

it's a quarter

We're not

past

12:00

So, we'll stand in recess and return here at 1:30,
proceed at that time.

24

(Recess.)

25

THE COURT:

Please be seated.
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EXHIBIT B

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
F,LED

DEC - 2 1993
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY.

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT DAVIS AND MICHELE DAVIS,
SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

ROBERT O. MURRAY, M.D. and GRAND
COUNTY SERVICE AREA dba ALLEN
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
Defendants,

}

Civii No. 9107-26
Judge Bruce K. IJalliday

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the. following questions from a preponderance of the evidence. If you find
the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If you find the
evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot determine a preponderance of the evidence, or
if you find that the evidence preponderates against the issue presented, answer ' 'No." Also, any
damages assessed must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

1.

Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, Dr. Robert 0.

Murray, M.D., negligent?
ANSWER:
2.

Yes

No

If youi answer to Question 1 is "Yes," was such negligence a proximate cause

of the death of the child?
ANSWER:
3.

Yes

No

X

Considering all the evidence in this case, was the defendant, Allen Memorial

Hospital, negligent?
ANSWER:
4.

Yes

No

X

If your answer to Question 3 is "Yes," was such negligence a proximate cause

of the death nf the child?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

Y

NOTE: if you answered Questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 " N o , " you need not go further
in answering additional questions. Please sign the verdict form and notify the Coun. If you have
answered Questions 1, 2, 3 or 4 "Yes," please proceed to the next question.
5.

If you bave answered either of Questions 2 or 4 "Yes," then, and only then,

answer the following question:
Assuming the combined negligence of all parties to total 100%, what percentage
of that negligence is attributable to:
A.

Defendant, Dr. Robert 0. Murray

B.

Defendant, Allen Memorial Hospital
TOTAL

6.

%
%
100%

If you have answered either or both Questions 2 or 4 u Yes," state the amount

of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiffs as a proximate result or uie
injuries complained of. If" such questions were not answered *l Yes,'' do not answer this question.
Special Damages:
Special Damages

$1,298.89

General Damages:

$

TOTAL
DATED Uiis

J

day of
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EXHIBIT E

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT AND MICHELE DAVIS,
MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 9207-26
DATE: 11/29/93
JUDGE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY
Tapes: 93-258.1 thru
93-258.12
Clerk Vickie Riley

vs
ROBERT 0- MURRAY, M.D.
ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
Defendants.

JURY TRIAL
PRESENT:

Plaintiffs Robert and Michelle Davis
Kay Osteen
Plaintiffs' Attys John Black, Sr. and John Black, Jr.
Defendant's Atty M. Dayle Jeffs

This is the day and hour set for the above entitled
case. Commencing at 9:30 a.m. all parties were present and ready
to proceed.
Out of the presence of the prospective jurors, Mr.
Jeffs objected to voir dire questions numbered 11, 12, 17, 20,
21, 25 and 28. Court disallowed numbers 17, 20, 25 & 28. The
summoned jurors were escorted back into the courtroom. The clerk
administered the qualification oath en masse. Fifteen jurors
were then called to the jury box. Five jurors were challenged
and excused for cause, to wit: Ronald Dolphin, Adam Newell,
August Brooks, Anna Marie Englebright and Lena Stocks. Both
sides passed for cause. Each attorney took 3 peremptory
challenges (total of 6 ) .
The following are jurors to serve on this case: one is
selected as an alternate. Juror to be announced at end of trial,
before deliberation. Parties stipulated that it would be the 9th
juror called.

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

JOHN L. BLACK, SR., #0 3 48
JOHN L. BLACK, JR., #0349
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 West 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 363-3550

F,LE0

NOV 2 2 1993
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY

Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT DAVIS and MICHELE
DAVIS,
PROPOSED VOIR DIRE
QUESTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GRAND COUNTY SERVICE AREA, dba
ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

Case No. 9207-26
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

Defendant.
Plaintiffs hereby request the Court ask the following voir
dire questions, along with appropriate follow-up questions, of the
jury panel in addition to the questions which the Court normally
asks:
1.

Are you, or anyone close to you, related to a doctor,

dentist, nurse, or connected with a hospital?
2.

Do you know any of the parties or their attorneys in

this case?
3.

Are you acquainted with any of the following people:

Kay Osteen, Dr. Tom Harris, Dr. Robert Murray, Georgia Russell?
A.

Have you any children in your household?

If so, how

many and what are their ages?
5.

Have you, or anyone close to you, ever had a baby that

was born prematurely?

If so, did the baby live or die?

6.

Have you or anyone close to you ever been sued?

7.

Have you or anyone close to you sued someone else?

8.

Have you or anyone close to you been a witness in a

legal proceeding?
9.

Have you or anyone close to you ever served on a jury?

10.

Have you or anyone close to you ever worked in a

medical office or hospital?
11.

If so, please explain.

Do you have any feelings about a patient suing his or

her doctor or a hospital?
12.

Do you have any feelings about medical malpractice

cases in general?
13.

What magazines do you or members of your household

subscribe to?
14.

What is your profession?

15.

What is your spouse's profession?

16.

Is there anything you have read, heard, or experienced

about medical malpractice cases which would cause you to doubt that
you could be fair to all parties?
17.

Do you believe that a verdict against Allen Memorial

Hospital in this case could affect you?
18.

Do you have any doubts at all that you can be fair to

all the parties in this case?
19.

Do you have any prejudices for or against any person

bringing a malpractice case?

2

20.

Do you own any stocks or bonds, or have you ever been

employed by any casualty company that insures against actions for
injury and death?
21.

The term "malpractice11 is used in this case, but you

will be told by the Court that it means negligence on the part of
persons or hospitals and not intentional harm.

Are you willing to

follow such legal instructions?
22.

Do you

understand

that

this

is a civil, not

a

criminal, case and that it involves a claim for money damages and
not a criminal penalty or punishment?

Are you willing to consider

the case in that light?
23.
today?

Have you heard anything about this case prior to

If so, has this given you any possible prejudices or

feelings that may affect your judgment?
24.

After the evidence has been presented, the Judge will

instruct you on the law involved in this case.

Are you willing to

be bound by the Court's instructions even if you have doubts about
them?
25.

If you find that the Davis's are entitled to recover

a verdict, and you also find that their damages are substantial,
would you have any hesitation in bringing in a substantial verdict
for the Davis's?
26.

Do you or someone close to you have a background in

law or legally related matters?
27.
law firm?

If so, explain.

Do you or has someone close to you ever worked for a
If so, explain.
3

28.

Do you or does someone close to you have a background

in reviewing or analyzing claims for personal injuries?
DATED this

£*& day of August, 1993.

JOHN/L. BLACK, SR.
J6HWL. BLACK, JR.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

RECEIVED A COPY OF THE FOREGOING PLAINTIFFS7 PROPOSED VOIR DIRE
QUESTIONS THIS
DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1993.

M. DAYLE JEFFS
Attorney for Defendant

4

EXHIBIT F

1

record.

2

25, I'm disallowing.

Again, I believe that it's a

3

little too broad and the definition of substantial

4

something to be desired.

leaves

5

The 26 and 27 that you've withdrawn, I had indicated

6

that I was going to--to--to allow those in, so that--and then

7

28, I am--I have disallowed also.

8

MR. JEFFS:

Thank you, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

Any exceptions to be noted, Mr. Black?

10

MR. BLACK, JR.:

No, your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

I think that handles--

12

MR. JEFFS:

There is one other matter.

13

a set of preliminary instructions to the Court.

14

think--

I submitted
There are, I

15

THE COURT:

There are five of them?

16

MR- JEFFS:

--five of them in number there.

They're

17

virtually right out of Mugi as preliminary instructions.

18

would request the Court, as I did in'my request, that those be

19

given to

20

before opening statements.

(sic) the Court after selection of the jury and

I assume the Court, after the jury selection, will

21
22

discharge

23

selected a--

24

25

I

the non-selected

THE COURT:
MR. JEFFS:

jurors and give those who are

Another oath.
--15-minute recess to call their boss or
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EXHIBIT G

1

the--the

i s s u e s b e f o r e the Court?

2

MR. DOWD:

3

THE COURT:

4

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

5

I'll

try.

Who was the next one?

My daughter was born there

three years ago.

6

THE COURT:

7

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

8

THE COURT:

9

I think--

Again, would you experience-It wouldn't.

Doesn't dictate one way or the other

that you would favor--

10

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

No.

11

THE COURT: Now, let me ask I guess, I think that we

12

kind of covered this, but just out of an abundance of caution,

13

we've asked whether you've had some relationship or if you

14

know the parties and the witnesses and so forth, but--but

15

have--have

15

plaintiffs or the defendants which would--which would bias you

17

either for or against Mr. and Mrs. Davis, the Allen Memorial

18

Hospital

19

information, would they raise their hand?

20

are raised.

any of you acquired any information

or

Dr.

Murray?

If

anyone

has

about

acquired

the

any

I see that no hands

I thought that we had pretty well covered that.

21

Have--have any of you or a member of your immediate

22

family or close acquaintance ever had a child die during or

23

shortly after childbirth?

24

their right hand.

25

Have

you

If anyone has, would they raise

No hands are raised.
or

a member

of

your

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101

family

or

close
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1

survived?

2

MS. STANGLE:

3

THE

4

COURT:

Yes.
Have

He's fine,
any

of

the

jurors

Have--has anyone close to you been sued?

5

No one's

raised their hands there.

7

Have any of you been witnesses-'

8

MR. JEFFS:
I

The other half of that--the other half

of that question, your Honor, I'd ask would be, have any of

10

them brought suit against anyone?

H

sued, you didn't ask if they had brought a suit
THE COURT:

12

You asked if they had been

Okay. I'm sorry.

13 I

brought suit against anybody?

I

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

14

sued?

Anyone raise your hand if you have.

5

9

been

Have--have any of you

I settled an automotive claim,

it was a lawsuit in Louisiana.

15
15

I

THE COURT:

Involving an automobile accident?

17

J

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

19

|

No, it was (inaudible) the car

backfired and a part blew off and hit my son on the forehead

19

and he sued (inaudible) the insurance company took care of it,

20

it was three years getting settled, it was settled the first

21

of the year.

22

THE COURT:

But the fact that you've been involved

23

in a lawsuit, does that fact bias you in favor or against a

24

plaintiff or a defendant in this lawsuit?

25

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

I think not.
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I didn't have to

£2

1

appear anyplace, it all took place in Louisiana and mine was

2 I

phone--phone participation.

3

I

THE COURT:

4 ]

I ^ee.

Have--I think that we've asked before.

Have--I

5

think that the only people that have had experience either

g

working in a hospital or--or in the professional capacity as

7

a

Q

specifically.

9

worked in a hospital or had any experience?

nurse,

we've

kind

of

gone

at;

but

I

haven't

asked

Have--have anyone--has anyone else actually

Do--do any of the jurors have any feelings either

10
11

for

or

against

somebody

bringing

a

lawsuit

alleging

12

malpractice against their doctor or the doctor and/or the

13

hospital?

14

I--I didn't explain to the jury, but this is a civil

15

action, malpractice is a civil action, it's not a criminal

16

action and as such, you--you need to understand that and that-that

17
18
19 I

it involves a claim of money damages

involve any kind of criminal punishment.

and does not

Do all of the jury

understand that?

2Q i

You'll find out and we'll have a--some instructions

I

as to your overall obligations and so forth, but basically the

21

22
23
24
25

jury is to determine the facts of the case, that's--that you
listen to the witness and you determine the facts and then you
apply the law which I will instruct you about at the end of
the case to those facts and it's based upon the application of
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EXHIBIT H

INDEX TO
JURY VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS
ASKED BY THE COURT
In the transcript of the jury voir dire, (R. 548-628), the court asked prospective jurors
questions on the following subjects:
1.

Relationships, occupation, employer, marital status, spouse's employer and marital status,
children, significant information. (R. 566-70).

2.

Familiarity with the facts and circumstances of the case. (R. 571).

3.

Any relationship with the parties, counsel, or witnesses. (R. 572).

4.

Any debtor/creditor relationship. (R. 595).

5.

Ever served on a jury before. (R. 595).

6.

Ever been a patient at defendant Allen Memorial Hospital. (R. 598).

7.

Any jurors related to each other. (R. 591).

8.

Acquire any information regarding plaintiff or defendant which would cause bias for any
of the parties. (R. 600).

9.

Ever had a child die during or shortly after childbirth. (R. 600).

10.

Ever been a patient at St. Mary's Hospital. (R. 601).

11.

Ever had an experience with premature birth. (R. 606).

12.

Ever been sued or brought suit against anyone. (R. 609).

13.

Ever worked in a hospital or similar experience. (R. 610).

14.

Feelings for or against someone bringing a malpractice action against their doctor or
hospital. (R. 610).

15.

Explanation that this is a civil action not a criminal action involving money damages not
punishment. (R. 610).

16.

Any reservations about accepting the instructions and applying the law. (R. 611).

17.

Anyone legally trained. (R. 611).

18.

Any scheduling conflicts. (R. 612).

EXHIBIT I

1

MR. NEWELL:

2

THE COURT:

Oh.

No, no.

--that you would have to believe him?

3

He's been indicated that' he will be a witness in this matter;

4

would--would your relationship make you tend--tend to make you

5

believe him more than some other witness who is sworn and

6

testifies here?

7

MR. NEWELL:

I--I think I'd believe Dr. Murray.

8

THE COURT:

You think that you would believe Dr.

9
10

Murray above and beyond some other witness that you're not
acquainted with?

11

MR. NEWELL:

12

THE COURT:

13

Yes.
You want to go further, Counsel, or do

Y o u want to make any challenges as we go?

14

MR.

BLACK,

JR.:

I

think

Mr.

Newell

can

be

15

challenged for cause, based upon his statement that he would

15

believe Dr. Murray's testimony over that of another witness'.

17

I think that qualifies for cause, and I'd ask that he be

18

excused.

19

THE COURT:

Mr. Jeffs?

20

MR. JEFFS:

I have no objection.

2i

THE COURT:

I think under those circumstances, Mr.

22

Newell, I think that you will, and I would--I guess

23

lecture you a little bit.

24

regardless of their personal connections and so forth, they're

25

sworn to tell the truth. Now, it's true that some people don't

When people come
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I'll

into Court,

27

1

counsel for the defense have a--

2

MR. JEFFS:

We would challenge him for cause.

3

THE COURT:

I think that's an appropriate challenge

4

for cause, and we'll excuse--do you want--do you have any

5

exception to--

6

MR. BLACK, JR.:

7

THE COURT:

8

No, your Honor.

I'll excuse Mr. Dalphin.

Ask the clerk

to draw the next name.

9

THE CLERK:

Joseph Dowd.

10

THE COURT:

Mr. Dowd, tell us a little bit about

11
12

yourself.
MR- DOWD: My name is Newell Dowd.

I'm retired.

My

13

wife and I (inaudible) I am the son of Mrs. Stocks, that's

14

about the size of it, and we both wear hearing aids that may

15

hinder the fact of what we hear is not exactly what's said,

16

especially.

17

THE COURT:

Does--does the disability which you

18

have, Mr. Dowd, do you think that that is going to affect you

19

in such a fashion that you--you won't be able to hear the

20

proceedings?

2i

on so far, have you not?

22
23
24
25

You've been able to hear everything that's gone

MR. DOWD:

I have, remarkably so, I believe I've

heard everything correctly, yes.
THE COURT:

Have--I guess I'm going to skip over

that, for the time being, at any rate. You've heard the names
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1 I
2

THE

biased because of my professional relationship with-THE COURT:

Make it extremely uncomfortable for you

to bring in a verdict against one party or the other?

7

MR. BROOKS:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BLACK, SR.:

10

of this

MR. BROOKS: No; I don't, but I feel that I would be

5
6

Do you have any knowledge

particular case?

3
4

COURT:

Yes.
Cause objection?
We challenge the jury--juror for

cause, your Honor, based on his own statement.

11

THE COURT:

I think then, Mr. Brooks, you've brought

12

that up twice, and I think the fact that you brought it up

13

twice probably says that we'll excuse you this particular

14

time.

15

when I excuse somebody, it's--it's--it shouldn't be taken as

16

any--as any kind of a condemnation or anything else, it's just

17

one of those things that--that they happen.

Again, if I forget, and I've done this already, to--

18

And I also want to thank people when they leave for

19

being here in the first place, so I think, Mr. Brooks, I'll

20

excuse you and we'll call another name.

2i

THE CLERK:

Suzanne Stangle.

22

THE COURT:

You can just stay standing for a minute

23

and tell us a little bit about yourself, Ms. Stangle, if you

24

will, please.

25

MS. STANGLE:

My name

is Suzanne
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1

THE COURT:

Kim Hardman.

And I'11--kind of, you

2

know, I--I use that fly in the soup analogy; but--but again,

3

we haven't heard the fkcts

4

relationship which you have with these potential witnesses

5

and/or the party, Dr. Murray, make it so that you would be for

6

or against the--the position?

7

MS. ENGELBRIGHT:

in this case.

Does--does this

As you've been questioning other

8

people, I've asked myself that.

I would hope not.

I would

9

try to be objective.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BLACK, JR. : Well, based upon her statement that

Any challenge for cause?

12

Kim Hardman

13

relationship of a friendship and--and trust, and I'm sure that

14

Ms. Engelbright would try her best to be fair, but under the

15

circumstances, I'm not sure that she could be; so we'd move

16

for cause on her.

17

MR.

18

is a good

JEFFS:

friend,

I

I think

don't

think

that

it

indicates

satisfies

a

the

requirement of challenge for cause.
THE COURT: Well, it's a close one, but I think that

19
20

I'll excuse Ms. Engelbright in this particular case.

21

Call another witness--or another juror, excuse me

22 I

THE CLERK:

23

THE COURT: Before you sit down, Ms. Smith, will you

|

24 I
25

Marjorie Smith.

tell us a little bit about yourself?
MS. SMITH:

A 75-year-old widow.
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1

I--I think that I'm going to excuse Ms. Stocks just

2

on the basis of--of her ability to hear more than anything

3

else, but we've got an additional reason where--where they are

4

related, so on both those reasons, Ms. Stocks, I'm going to

5

excuse you.

Mr. Dowd, you have to stay, okay?

5

MS. STOCKS:

Thank you.

7

THE COURT:

Call the next juror.

8

THE CLERK:

B.D. Doherty.

9

THE COURT:

Ms. Doherty, will you take the seat up

10

here, but before you sit down, tell us a little bit about you

11

if you will, please.

12

MS. DOHERTY:

Yes.

My husband and I are retired.

13

We moved here about nine years ago from Boulder, Colorado, and

14

we retired from our professions, I was a nurse and he was a

15

physicist and we have three children.

16

THE COURT: You may sit down.

The fact that you're-

17

-that you were a nurse and have retired as a nurse, and this

18

will involve testimony by nurses and doctors and people in the

19

medical realm, does--does your experience, your employment

go

experience make it so it would be difficult for you to render

2i

a fair and impartial judgment in this case?

22

MS. DOHERTY:

23

THE COURT:

24

have

personal

25

witnesses

No.
And a g a i n ,

relationships

before

you--I

mean

I

take

with--with
other

than

it
the

you

parties

since
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EXHIBIT J

1

those facts to the law whether or not there's--whether the

2

decision is for or against the--the parties to the action.

3

So, do--do any of you have any reservations about accepting my

4

instructions and then applying the facts which you determine

5

in the jury room to those instructions?

6

No one has raised their hand.

7

|

Is anyone in the jury in--of the potential jury,

8

jurors, legally trained or have any law training?

9

raised their hands.

10
11 I

Have any of you worked in law offices or in a legal
capacity?
Ms. Smith?

13 I

MS. SMITH:

14

THE COURT:

15

locally.

MS. SMITH:

17

THE COURT:

19
20

25

Elaine Matthews is an attorney here

February of '92 to June of '92.
For a short period of time.

Would--

lawyers, or make it more difficult for you to--to evaluate the
evidence that has been--that will be presented here?

22

24

I worked for Elaine Matthews for awhile.

would your experience there bias you for or against any of the

21

23

I believe.

What period of time did that take place?

i6

18

No one has

MS. SMITH:

No.

THE COURT:

Any--anything that I've skipped over,

gentlemen?
MR. BLACK, SR. : I can't think of anything that your
Honor has missed.
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EXHIBIT K

A8-The Times-Independent, Thursday, September 23,1993

"Decision time" for hospital
choices, Senior Citizens told
Moab's senior citizens were told
it's "decision time" for hospital
choices at a luncheon held at the
Senior Citizen Community Center
Friday, Sept. 17.
Hospital vice-chairman, Dixie
Barksdale, presented a series of options Grand County property owners
and residents will need to consider
for continued operation of Allen
Memorial Hospital in Moab.
Those choices arc:
• Choosing to re-authorize the
hospital special service district taxing authority where property owners
share in the expenses of operating
the medical services at Allen
Memorial Hospital (this was defeated
in the 1992 election);
• Choosing to enact a one percent
sales tax for continued operation of
the hospital and other medical-related
services in the county (this option
would be shared by travelers using
local facilities and shopping during
vacation);
• Asking the County Council to
divert funds from its general fund to
subsidize operations of the hospital;
or,
• Leasing, or selling the hospital

to a private medical corporation operating hospitals in larger areas.
Both the taxing authority and the
one percent sales tax initiative would
need voter election. The extent of patient care and services provided as an
acute care facility with a 24-hour
emergency staff will also need to be
scrutinized. The $2.8-million annual
operating cost has been subsidized
by a l/10th of one percent mill levy
to property owners which ends this
year. The subsidy has been about
S200,000 each year. Operating revenue in 1992 amounted to $2.6 million. The sales tax measure could
generate close to $1 million annually. Speculation about other emergency services, such as search and
rescue, free clinics and health education programs has enhanced consideration of that option.

Barksdale, who was appointed to
the .board in February, said she
quickly learned factors that make the
health care field uniquely different.
"To make the best policy decisions,
hospital board members need to understand the characteristics of managing a hospital. Policy or strategic
decisions that do not consider the
hospital's regulatory environment or
support its special focus on patient
care could erode the hospital's mission, and if day-to-day operational
pressures, especially economic constraints, are given greater consideration than the patient care, the consequences can be disastrous," she said.
"The public is more aware of
health issues and, consequently, expectations arc raised. Most of us still
don't completely understand the
complexities of health care delivery,
so when our expectations and lack of
knowledge combine with our emotions, many times misunderstandings and dissatisfaction result,"
Barksdale added
She pointed out that patient care is
imperative. Other organizations can

EXHIBIT K

perform certain functions in private,
but the hospital must provide care
365 days a year, 24 hours a day—"all
under the watchful eye of the press
and the public "
A few mistakes may be tolerated
in other fields, but even the most
minor error by a health care provider
can prove fatal to a patient.
Other factors affecting the delivery
of care include the range of technological advancements in the health
care field; an area expanding more
and more rapidly. New services and
new devices are constandy being introduced, so in-service training to
staff and the development or modification of policies and procedures and
contingency plans for equipment j
malfunctions, for instance, arc in
regular review. So is the specialization in staff. Partly in response to
the increasingly sophisticated technology used in health care, practitioners have become even more specialized. "The hometown family
physician who delivered babies, removed tonsils, performed appendectomies, and became a part of the
family, is almost extinct," Barksdale
said She noted, "It's understandable
that those of us who depended on our
family doctor for all our medical and
emotional needs arc experiencing
frustration with today's trend to specialization."
Seniors attending the luncheon
voiced concern over rising costs in
medical care due to malpractice suits,
need for a local insurance like those
operating in some states that have
been considered successful, high
staff-to-paticnt ratios, low hospital
occupancy, and lack of continued information to the public about the
needs and operations of the local
hospital. One questioned the need for
a hospital. And, one question directed to Mayor Tom Stocks, concerned the possibility of part of the
Moab City local sales tax being
earmarked for health care.
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
FILED

APR 1 8 1394
CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

::
:

ROBERT DAVIS and MICHELE
DAVIS,
Plaintiffs,

BY

D«puty

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

vs.

:

ROBERT O. MURRAY, M.D. and
GRAND COUNTY SERVICE AREA,
dba ALLEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

:
:
:

Defendants.

:
:

Civil No. 920700026
Judge Bruce K. Halliday

The Court having received a Notice to Submit for Decision on
Plaintiffs 7 Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion for
New Trial, and having reviewed the pleadings, statutes, and

case

law submitted by the parties, now makes its findings and decision.
Plaintiff has moved this Court to reconsider
Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial.
a

its ruling

on

Defendant has responded that

Motion for Reconsideration is not provided for under the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court is concerned about a Petition

for Reconsideration and that concern is based upon the
which

all parties and the Court have

in finality

interest

of decisions.

However, here the Plaintiffs' filed their Motion for New Trial pro
se

and

some

deference

Reconsideration
Trial.

may

may

be

be treated

allowable
as

an

and/or

amended

the

Motion

Motion
for

a

for
New

In the alternative, it may possibly be reviewed as a Rule

2

60 Motion provided the same is timely filed and/or adequate grounds
thereunder exist.
The

Court has concluded

to review Plaintiffs7

Motion

for

Reconsideration under one or both of the foregoing theories.
However considered, the ultimate questions appear to be:
1.

Was there newly discovered evidence and/or

2.

Was that newly discovered evidence plain error or so

prejudicial as to require this Court to order a new trial.
The Court cannot find either newly discovered evidence, or
evidence so prejudicial or so plainly erroneous that a new trial is
justified.
The conclusions which the Plaintiffs wish the Court to draw,
to-wit, that the media blitz was unknown and must have had some
detrimental effect upon the decision which the various jurors made
with regard to this matter is just not sustained by any of the
evidence

herein.

All

of the newspaper

articles

submitted

by

Plaintiffs were known to or with reasonable diligence could have
been known to Plaintiffs.

Further, the Court cannot conclude that

there exists any connection between Plaintiffs7 counsel's failure
to inquire into those specific attitudes of the jury and a finding
by the jury of no claim.

Certainly I cannot conclude that there is

clear error and it is certainly npt obvious to this Court that even
assuming error, that it is harmful or prejudicial and that there is
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome to the

3

Plaintiffs

or

that

the

Courtis

confidence

undermined to any extent whatsoever.

in

the

verdict

is

The verdict entered by the

jury herein was a special verdict wherein they found no cause of
action against the doctor as well as the hospital, although the
hospital at the time of trial was the only party Defendant at risk.
It clearly appears from the special verdict that no deliberations
were made with regard to any amount of damages.

Plaintiffs7 Motion

and arguments assume that the overriding concern of the community
was to retain the hospital at all "costs", even to the extent that
randomly

selected

deliberate

with

members

regard

of

the

community

Plaintiffs7

to

would

claim(s).

not

fairly

However,

as

Plaintiffs7 exhibits show, the community had declined to support
the hospital through tax increases, and therefore the contrary,
opposite overriding concern, to-wit, to terminate the hospital 7 s
existence, would be an equally logical assumption.
The

Court

can

clearly

see

that

from

the

attachments

of

Plaintiffs7 to their application that they feel the community was
prejudiced

against them.

The Court believes that

appropriate

inquiry was made into any such prejudice in the normal voir dire.
Plaintiffs7 attempt to bootstrap their fear that a small community
who knows everyone would be prejudiced against them into "clear
error", and that such a community would protect the hospital and
staff at all costs, fails.

Their attempt to connect the publicity

blitz to their claim of prejudice fails because any of a number of

4

possible

alternatives

to their

explanation

of

the verdict

is

equally as likely an explanation and the most likely is that the
jurors concluded that the doctor and the hospital had done all
things possible under the circumstances.
The grounds, whether considered under a Rule 59 Motion or even
under a Rule 60 Motion to Set Aside the Verdict and Order a New
Trial, requires the newly discovered evidence to be material which
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and
produced at trial.

The same is true under a Rule 60 Motion but

even more restrictively since there the newly discovered evidence
must be such that by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for the new trial under Rule 59(b).
The conclusions which the Court therefore draws is:
1.

That

the

material

was

in

fact

available,

the

information was available and due diligence would have disclosed
same.
2.

Even assuming arguendo that the material was not

available and is newly discovered and would qualify, the Court
cannot find that either clear error or prejudice to the Plaintiffs
existed as a result of counsel and the Court's failure to inquire
into

the

particular

information

attitudes

published

in

the

of

jurors
various

with

regard

newspaper

to

the

reports.

Plaintiffs7 pleadings, arguments and case law do not substantiate

5

this Court finding any such nexus between the alleged error and/or
prejudice to the Defendant and the verdict seems to clearly weigh
against any such finding.
For and on account of the foregoing the Court hereby denies
Plaintiffs' Motion f or\Reconsiderat:j/)n
DATED this / £

day of

, 1994.

BRUCE K. HALLIDA^
District Court Judge

EXHIBIT M

1

not bias you for or against anyone in the---that would test ify

2

and come f rom there?

3

Ms. Stangle'p

4

MS. STANGLE

5

patient

6

judgment

care

About four years ago, I had some in-

there,

I

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. STANGLE :

9

THE COURT:

10

Ms. Davis?

11

MS. STANGLE :

12

MS. DAVIS:

13

my

husband

14

judgment at a.LI.

16

that

would

affect

my

And you said how long ago, again?
About four years ago.

Four years ago?

Or out-patient.

One of my children were born there and

was therei

THE COURT:

15

don't think

twice.

And

it

wouldn't

affect

my

Ms. Smith, any experience over in- -in

Grand Junction?

17

MS. SMITH:

Not that I recall.

18

THE COURT:

Pardon me?

19

MS. SMITH:

Not that I recall.

20

THE COURT:

I--I think that, Mr . Jeffs, that I've--

21
22
23

I've

fairly well handled

reques,ted

requests and unless you have isome specif ic inquiry that you
wish for me to make.
MR. JEFFS:

24
25

the remainder of your

already.

You may be going to ask this question

I wanted to know if any of them, a close member of
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1

not bias you f:or or against anyone in the--that would testify

2

and come from there?

3

Ms. Stangle?

4

MS. STANGLE:

5

patient

care

6

judgment.

there,

I don't

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. STANGLE:

9

Ms. Davis?

11

MS. STANGLE:

12

MS. DAVIS:
my

husband

14

judgment at a 11.

would

affect

my

About four years ago.

Or out-patient.
One of my children were born there and

there

THE COURT:

15
16

was

that

Four years ago?

10

13

think

And you said how long ago, again?

THE COURT:

,

About four years ago, I had some in-

twice.

And

it wouldn't

affect

my

Ms. Smith, any experience over in--in

Grand Junction?

17

MS. SMITH:

Not that I recall.

18

THE COURT:

Pardon me?

19

MS. SMITH:

Not that I recall.

20

THE COURT:

I--I think that, Mr. Jeffs, that I've--

fairly well handled

the remainder of your

requested

21

I've

22

requests and unless you have some specific inquiry that you

23

wish for me to make.

24

MR. JEFFS:

25

already.

You may be going to ask this question

I wanted to know if any of them, a close member of
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1

1

their family, immediate family or a close acquaintance that

2

has had a--the birth of a premature child, premature birth,

3 |

and whether that would affect their ability to be fair and

4 I

impartial

5

THE COURT:

5

had

7

experience with a premature birth?

8

wa

an

experience

Have--have any of the potential jurors

13

a

close

acquaintance

have

an

Let me just ask it that

Let's start up here.
UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

10

12

had

Y•

9 J

11

or

I had a daughter that was born

12 weeks in Moab and would have died without Dr. Mayberry's
assistance.

He slept in the same room and kept her alive,

she's alive today.
THE

14

COURT:

Does

that

experience--would

that

15

experience make it so that you would tend to favor of disfavor

16

one

17

plaintiff

or the parties in this action?

18

different

doctor, but

19

That's what I'm--I guess I'm inquiring.

20

fact

21

22

of

the

that

parties, either

you

had

it may

that

good

the

parties,

involve

the

the

parties

It involves a
same

hospital.

Does the--does the

experience

and

you

have

a

daughter, would that make it so that you couldn't fairly and
impartially try the issues that--

23

UNIDENTIFIED JUROR:

24

THE COURT:

25

of

I don't think so.

--Mr. and Mrs. Davis bring before this

Court?
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